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Abstract 
One criticism of failure prediction models is the bias resulting from pooling failure data 
over years when economic conditions might influence the failure of a firm.  This research 
incorporates both macroeconomic variables and firm specific variables in explaining 
corporate failure.  The results suggest that including economic variables improve the 
explanation of failure by ten percent. The economic variables included in the analysis 
were one-year lag in change in GDP, a two-year lag in interest rates, a one-year lag in the 
share price index, and a one-year lag in corporate profits.  Economic variables were 
identified using a principal component analysis of key economic variables. 
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Micro and Macro Determinants of Financial Distress  
By 
 
Ray McNamara, Keith Duncan, Simone Kelly 
 
Introduction 
The problem of financial distress takes on increased importance in view of the number 
and size of company failures, both public and private, following the market failure of the 
1987 Market Crash, the Savings and Loan Crisis of the early 1990s, the internet bubble of 
the late 1990s and the on-going global financial crisis.  Numerous studies attempt to 
predict financial distress based on firm specific (micro) information.  However, both 
anecdotal and empirical evidence (Rose et al., 1982) suggests that macroeconomic 
conditions are relevant to a firm’s success or failure (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009, 
Fitzpatrick and Ogden, 2011, Liu, 2009).  Indeed many firm specific predictors of firm 
distress may be accurate under certain economic conditions (Cybinski, 1995, McNamara 
et al., 1988, Kane et al., 1996, Nam et al., 2000, Richardson et al., 1998). 
Understanding corporate failure in the context of macroeconomic conditions is important 
to managers, consultants, creditors, auditors and financial analysts.  Managers and 
consultants need to better understand the interaction between economic conditions and 
firm performance if they are to develop and manage reconstruction strategies.  Lending 
personnel can better adjust their risk ratings in the light of changing economic 
circumstances and firm specific characteristics.  Auditors’ reports are an important signal 
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about failing firms through qualifications and going concern exceptions.  The cost of not 
qualifying a set of accounts when they are to fail may result in a significant legal liability 
to the auditor.  Arguing a firm is not a going concern when it can continue its operations 
can in itself lead to failure.  Both these audit risks can be reduced if the auditor 
appreciates the interaction between a firm’s characteristics and the various states of 
nature the firm may face.  Financial analysts need to cast their recommendations in the 
light of economic conditions.  What may appear as viable firm characteristics in an 
economic boom may be disastrous in a recession. 
 The purpose of this paper is to assess whether both firm specific and macroeconomic 
indicators combine to explain the failure of public companies.  The remainder of the 
paper proceeds as follows.  Section two details the literature on firm failure and selected 
literature on economic variables that a priori give impact on firm performance.  The 
section concludes with a model of firm failure.  Section three details the research 
methods and the data analysis.  The final section discusses the findings, limitations, and 
directions for future research.  
Literature Review 
Failure prediction, built on the work of Altman (1968) and Beaver (1966), has tested the 
predictive ability of different combinations of over 100 ratios (Zmijewski, 1984).  This 
research consistently shows that a significant percentage of failed firms can be correctly 
predicted one year prior (Altman, 1968, Altman, 1971, Altman et al., 1995, Altman et al., 
1977, Altman and Narayanan, 1997, Beaver, 1966, Beaver, 1968, Brunner and Krahnen, 
2008, Chan and Rotenberg, 1988, Deakin, 1972, Demers and Joos, 2007, Dietrich et al., 
2005, Divsalar et al., 2011, Eidleman, 1995, Gilbert et al., 1990, Hensher and Jones, 
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2007, Hu and Ansell, 2007, McNamara et al., 1988, Neophytou and Molinero, 2004).  
However, as Johnson (1970) states, “the ratios to predict failure…do not contain 
information about the intervening economic conditions…the riskiness for a given value of 
ratio changes with the business cycle” (Johnson, 1970; p.1116).  McNamara et al. (1988) 
qualified their findings by stating “the data employed restricts the generality of the 
results because we sampled from a period of economic recession.  The model therefore 
has validity for this state of nature only” (McNamara et al., 1988). A cursory examination 
of the incidence of corporate failure in Australia supports the proposition that economic 
conditions impact on the rate of firm collapse.  Figure 1 depicts the incidence of 
corporate failure from 1975 to 1995 as disclosed in the Australian Stock Exchange 
Annual Summaries. 
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Figure 1 Incidence of Public Company Failure 
Periods of economic recession, 1976 to 1978 and 1989 to 1992, show significant 
increases in company failure.  High interest rates, recession, squeezed corporate profits, 
and the heavy debt burdens are anecdotally considered as contributing factors to the 
increased incidence of corporate distress.   
However, the dramatic rise in the number of failures since 1987 suggests some systematic 
problem among analysts and lenders in their assessments of the viability of publicly listed 
companies.  Alternatively, the firm characteristics that predict success during periods of 
economic growth may indicate failure during times of recession.  Zavgren (1983) 
suggests that the pooling of failure data over several years may confound prediction 
results significantly.  If different years are characterized by widely differing incidences of 
firm failure, then prior probabilities will be distorted and hence failure prediction 
becomes unreliable (Eisenbeis, 1977; p. 892). 
This difficulty makes the value of commercial failure-prediction models suspect.  The 
most serious effect would be a tendency to understate the misclassification of surviving 
companies into the failing group.  The costs of such a misclassification would be serious 
for the company concerned particularly if they approached a provider of capital.  The low 
incidence of failure might also lead users of commercial prediction models to become 
over confident.   
Macroeconomic Variables 
Two researchers attempted to assess the impact of economic variables on the corporate 
failure.  Altman (1971)used a first difference regression analysis to explain the number of 
corporate failures from quarter to quarter.  The independent variables used were the 
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change in Gross National Product, the change in the Standard and Poor’s Index of 
Common Stock Prices, and the change in the national money supply.  The R2 in Altman’s 
equation was 0.19 indicating relatively little explanatory power for economic variables.  
Rose et al., (1982) argued that business failure is negatively correlated with cyclical 
changes – rising in periods of recession and falling in periods of economic expansion.  
They were able to explain the rate of business failure with an R2 of 0.912.  Three 
significant variables resulted from their step-wise regression; Standards and Poor’s 
Composite Stock Price Index, Corporate Profits, and ninety-day Treasury Bill Rate. 
Neither Altman et al. (1971) nor Rose et al. (1982) combined their economic variables 
with firm variables to classify failure of individual firms.  However, the variables 
identified by Rose et al. (1982) confirm the relationship between business cycle 
indicators and firm failure.  Modern European and American economists focus on 
multiplier interaction models and dynamic structural models of the cyclical process of the 
economy (Hicks, 1950, Klein, 1964, Smithies, 1957).  The extensive body of literature on 
the business cycle may be classified three major groups: 
• Supply or cost-push theories focusing on changes in business costs, net profits, and 
the cost of labor and other factors of production. 
• Monetary theories focus on the cost and availability of credit.  Variables identified by 
these theories include a range of interest rates and money-supply indicators. 
• Savings and Investment theories have their origin in nineteenth-century classical 
general-equilibrium models.  As the name suggests, these theories promote variables 
such as Gross Savings, Change in Business Investment, Industrial Production etc. 
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In addition, Rose et al. (Rose et al., 1982) included in their study variables identified in 
previous research that were correlated with cyclical changes.  These include indicators 
such as Share Price Indices, GNP, Unemployment Rates, and Personal Income variables. 
Detailed procedures are included in the Methods Section. 
Ratios 
With the exception of Beaver (1966) failure analysis had proceeded without any guiding 
theory of corporate failure or performance.  Beaver suggested that the firm is viewed as a 
“reservoir of liquid assets which is supplied by inflows and drained by outflows.  The 
solvency of the firms can be defined in terms of the probability that the reservoir will be 
drained.  While this framework was used to guide Beaver’s analysis the significant 
variables in his study were not effectively related to the concept of a firm as a reservoir.  
An alternate framework is to view the firm as a combination of four related sets of 
variables: 
• Activity Ratios; 
• Profitability Ratios; 
• Leverage Ratios; and 
• Liquidity Ratios 
This framework can be related to the cash reservoir formulation of Beaver (1968) 
Activity ratios are surrogates for a company’s ability to generate sales from its asset base.  
This measure is similar to Beaver’s measure of variables that top up the cash flow 
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reservoir. A company’s survival and long-term success depends on its ability to generate 
sufficient sales to support the level of assets committed to the business. 
Profitability ratios measure the ability of the firm to turn sales into profits.  If activity 
ratios determine the rate of flow of cash into the business, the profitability ratios measure 
the extent of the firm to control outflows.  Activity and profitability measures assess the 
fundamental viability of the corporation. Failure can occur because the outflows from 
expenses and overheads are too great relative to the sales generated.  Finally, failure can 
result from a combination of sales generation and profitability problems. 
While Activity and Profitability measures indicate the base operating capacity of the 
firm, Leverage Ratios are surrogates for the financial dimension of the firm.  They 
measure the claims on the cash flows of the firm.  How the surplus will be shared and the 
order in which they will be shared – debt first, and the surplus, if any, goes to equity. 
In the Australian context, debt sources of finance come with obligations to meet interest 
and principal repayments.  As these payments are legally enforceable, the commitments 
in various stages of the business cycle represent varying percentages of a corporation’s 
available cash flow claimed by debt. Modligliani and Miller (1958) propose that, in a 
world of taxes, firms should have 100% debt in their capital structure.  However, in an 
informed and rational capital market, suppliers of funds would not lend past the 
capacities of the borrower to pay. 
Thus, we would expect the obligation to pay in the lowest stage of the business cycle to 
represent the limit on the amount of debt acceptable in a company’s capital structure.  
The nature of the legal system also interacts with capital structure considerations to 
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determine this obligation to pay.  In countries where the legal and social attitudes to 
contracts do not follow the precepts of Judeo-Roman law, capital structure variables 
show different relationships than those of Australian, British and US economies.   For 
example, average debt levels in Japan range between 70% and 90% of total assets.  
Australian debt levels and US debt levels average between 40% and 65%.  McNamara et 
al. (1988) found debt levels in propriety companies to average 90% even though the 
primary source of the funds was the shareholders.   
In Japan, it is rare for a listed corporation to be placed in receivership.  Under the 
Japanese system, contracts are renegotiated if they are likely to be breached.  In western 
systems, a breach of a lending contract often leads to corporate distress or liquidation.  
This is true unless, the major supplier of debt funds also controls the company, as is the 
case with private companies in Australia.  Private companies in Australia have similar 
capital structures to Japanese public companies.  In both cases the holders of debt 
security are more likely to renegotiate rather than institute bankruptcy proceeding. 
All other things being equal, we would expect leverage ratios to play a major role in 
corporate failure for firms operating under Australian legal and business systems.  This 
ratio we would expect to be mitigated by the stage of the business cycle.  At the bottom 
of the business cycle, we would expect leverage ratios to be a major predictor of 
corporate distress.   
Liquidity ratios measure the short-term demand on a firm’s cash reservoir.  Fluctuations 
in the short-term cash inflows and the demand for cash outflows are often cited as a cause 
of corporate distress.  The driver for short-term financial demands may be related the 
capital structure during times of economic downturn and high interest rates.  Specifically, 
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high interest payments when demand for goods and services are low may lead to a cash 
shortage.  An attempt to remedy this by reducing margins to increase cash inflows can 
lead to deteriorating liquidity levels. 
Whether low liquidity levels cause financial distress depends on the industry and the 
economic power of the company concerned.  For example, Coles Myer Ltd. and 
Woolworths Ltd. both have acid test ratios around the 0.25 to 0.35 level.  However, their 
economic power enables them to extend their accounts payable turnover and survive what 
might normally be considered distressing liquidity levels.  
In general however, we would expect low liquidity levels to indicate an imbalance 
between short-term cash inflows and short-term cash outflows.  Low liquidity levels 
would be regarded as indicators of financial distress.  
Research Methods 
The data analysis comprises four stages: 
(1) Principal component analysis of the economic indicators to produce a reduced set 
of economic factors. 
(2) Principal component analysis of accounting ratios to produce a reduced set of 
ratios to confirm the existence of four factors driving the cash reservoir concept. 
(3) Regressing the accounting ratios identified in stage one against a dichotomous 
variable representing distressed vs. non-distressed firms. 
(4) Regressing the accounting and the economic factors identified stages one and two 
against a dichotomous variable representing distressed vs non-distressed firms. 
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The Sample 
The Annual Summaries of the Australian Stock Exchange list all companies for which a 
liquidator had been appointed in that year.  While there is significant debate over what 
constitutes financial distress, in the absence of any other compelling argument, the 
appointment of a liquidator seemed the most objective measure.   
Annual financial statement information was gathered manually for the period 1985 to 
2000 for companies included in the top 500 of the ASX by market capitalization that 
subsequently failed.  Companies were excluded from the analysis if they had no records 
in the AGSM microfiche or if any relevant financial data was omitted from their financial 
statements.  The most common missing data for the period 1985 to 1991 was a failure to 
report Sales Revenue.  This information is essential in calculating the profitability of a 
company and its asset turnover. Failed companies were matched with non-failed 
companies, as near as possible, on the basis of industry membership and total assets. 
A total of 92 companies, 46 failed and 46 non-failed were included in the sample.   
For these companies a range of financial ratios was calculated as per Table 1.  
The choice of accounting ratios was made after reviewing the literature on corporate 
distress.  However, unlike other studies no market-based variables are included in the 
analysis.  To understand and ultimately predict corporate distress, useful models need to 
lead the market not follow it. 
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Code Variable names 
  
Fail_NF Fail (0) and Non-Fail (1) Indicator Variable 
av1  ROE Before Extraoridnary and Abnormal 
av2  ROE Before Extraordinary only 
av3 ROE  After Extraordinary and Abnormal 
av4 Debt to  Assets  
av5 Debt to Asset before Revaluation after Intangibles 
av6 Debt to Equity 
av7 Long-term Debt to Total Assets 
av8 Long-term Debt to Assets after Intangibles & before Revaluation 
av9 Interest Expense to Total Liabilities 
av10 Acid Test  
av11 Current Ratio 
av12 Times Interest Earned 
av13 Times Interest Earned After Extraordinaries 
av14 Cash Flow to Current Liabilities 
av15 Return on Assets  
av16 Return on Assets after Intangibles & before Revaluations 
av17 Total Asset Turnover before Intangibles 
av18 Total Asset Turnover after Intangibles & before Revaluations 
av19 Net Profit Margin 
av20 Operating Profit Margin 
av21 Fixed Asset Turnover before Intangbiles 
av22 Fixed Asset Turnover after Intangibles & before Revaluations 
av23 Inventory Turnover 
av24 Days Receivable Outstanding 
av25 EBIT to Total Assets 
av26 EBIT to Total Assets after Intangibles & before  
av27 Revaluations Operating Income to Operating Assets 
av28 Operating Income to Operating Assets before Revaluations & after Intangibles 
av29 Liquid Ratio 
av30 Total Debt to Total Assets after Intangibles & before Revaluations 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
IR2yr Interest Rates 2 Year 
COPRF
AT 
Corporate Profits After Tax 
Table 1 Accounting Ratios for Failure Analysis 
These ratios were subject to a factor analysis to test their categorization as compared to 
the “cash reservoir” perspective on corporate distress/success.   
The macro-economic variables 
The macro economic variables chosen for this research were the Australian equivalents of 
the variables identified by Rose et al. (1982).  They drew their measures of economic 
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activity according to the Leading and Coincident Indicators, Supply or Cost-Push 
Theories, Monetary Economics, and Savings-Investment theories.  These theories 
provided an initial data set of 34 variables as listed in Table 2.  The DX Statistical Data 
Base at Bond University provided macroeconomic data for the relevant periods for failed 
companies. 
Leading and 
Coincident 
Indicators 
Supply or Cost Push 
Theories 
Monetary Theories Savings and 
Investment Theories 
Average Percapita 
GDP 
Average Weekly 
Earnings 
 
Monetary Aggregate Capital Expenditure 
Total GDP Consumer Price Index 
 
Money Supply M3 Dividend Yield 
Income Expenditure 
GDP 
Company Profits 
before tax interest and 
depreciation 
 
Bank Bill Rate 90 days Market Capitalisation 
Production 
Expenditure GDP 
Company Profits 
before interest and tax 
 
Bank Bill Rate 180 days Real Earnings 
Gross National 
Product 
Company Profits 
before tax 
Bank Loan Rate – 
Large 
 
Household Income 
Commonwealth 
Government 
Deficit/Surplus 
Corporate Tax Rate Bank Loan Rate - Small Household Savings 
Labour Force  Commercial Bill Rate – 
180 days 
National Income 
Real Gross 
Domestic Income 
 
 Treasury Bond Rate – 5 
years 
 
All Industrial Share 
Price Index 
 Treasury Bond Rate – 
10 years 
 
All Ordinaries Index  CGS   
Share market ave. 
daily turnover of 
equities 
   
Unemployment    
TABLE 2  MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
These variables are subject to principal component analysis to form a more parsimonious 
set for further analysis. 
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Data Analysis 
An analysis of the failed companies shows a decline in share value of 86% from three 
years prior to failure to the suspension of trading.  The fall in value from three years prior 
to one-year prior was only 20%.  This suggests that the market had not, in general, 
anticipated the failure of the companies. 
Stage 1: Principal Components Analysis – Macroeconomic Variables 
The variables suggested by the various macroeconomic theories are undoubtedly 
correlated.  Accordingly, the purpose of principal component stage of the analysis is to 
identify those variables whose variability is related to some underlying factor.  The 
factors found in this stage of the analysis will be the result of a varimax rotation and thus 
their orthogonality is enhanced. 
A varimax principal component analysis was applied to the macro economic variables.  
Three factors were extracted based on a scree test applied to the eigen values.  The eigen 
value graph is shown in Figure 2.  Based on the scree test there may be between four and 
six factors. The number of factors rotated can affect the structure that emerges.  Francis 
(1974) proved that the rotation of too few factors distorts the factor pattern such that it 
may bear no relation to the true underlying pattern.  Rummel (1970)concluded that it is 
preferable to rotate too many factors rather than too few.   
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In accord with the scree tests, four, five and six factor rotations were undertaken.  The 
rotated factor matrix for the principal component analysis is shown in Table 2 (only 
loading greater than .3 are reported).  Four interpretable factors emerged and were 
labeled as an Output Factor, Interest Factor, Market Factor, and a Corporate Activity 
Factor.  These three factors accounted for seventy percent of the total variance.  It would 
appear that no one macro-economic theory explains the nature of the factors that emerged 
from the analysis. 
The purpose of the factor analysis was to reduce the macro economic variables to a 
parsimonious-orthogonal set.  Based on the high loadings in the factor analysis stage, 
total GDP (TO_GDP), the 90 day Bill Rate (BB_90), the Share Price All Industrials 
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Index (SPI) and aggregate corporate profits before tax (CP_EBT) were used in the 
prediction of failure.  This choice was primarily on loading and intuitive appeal. 
The alternative would be the use of a composite score for each factor based on the factor 
coefficients obtained from the analysis.  Because of the inherent susceptibility of factor 
analysis to the errors in the value of the coefficients and to the variables 
included/excluded in the analysis, one variable was chosen to represent each factor.  That 
Variable Component  
Factor 1  2  3  4  5  
AVPC_GDP  .924      
TO_GDP  .918      
GDP_INC  .903      
R_GDI  .888      
GNP  .873      
GDP_P  .738      
UN_EPLY  -.503      
CAP_EXP  .379  .345     
DIV_YLD  .355      
BB_180   .946     
BB_90   .926     
TB_5Y   .787     
BBL_SML   .781     
BBL_LRG   .771     
TB_10Y   .708     
SPI_AI    .953    
SPI_AORD    .945    
MKT_CAP    .935    
MKT_TO    .822    
R_EARN       
CP_EBITD     .934   
CP_EBIT     .928   
CP_EBT     .900   
HHLD_INC     .802   
D_BASED     .604   
LBR_FRC       
CGS_THLD      .576  
AVE_ERN       
CPI_AGRP      .440  
CW_DEF      .421  
D_SP       
CORP_TAX       
NAT_INC       
HHL_SAV       
Table 3: Rotated Component Matrix 
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variable was one, if any, that best related to our cash-reservoir model and had a loading 
greater than 0.8   
Stage 2: Principal Components Analysis – Accounting Variables 
Principal component analysis of accounting ratios produced a reduced set of ratios to 
confirm the existence of five factors driving the cash reservoir concept.  These are shown 
in Table 3. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5  
AV16 0.96754 0.05709 0.05248 0.01827 0.08444 ROA 
AV27 0.96223 0.0643 0.07872 -0.06325 0.12577  
AV15 0.95874 0.10124 0.05484 0.00512 0.08743  
AV25 0.95484 0.11442 0.07043 -0.07275 0.13084  
AV12 0.36886 0.29343 0.09239 -0.17247 -0.03092  
AV17 0.11506 0.92126 -0.05328 -0.10591 0.11606 Asset Turnover 
AV18 0.01081 0.91679 -0.07505 -0.06276 0.09622  
AV21 0.00818 0.87277 -0.03231 -0.14725 0.06792  
AV22 0.17045 0.72791 0.06639 0.05097 -0.09897  
AV10 0.10996 0.00486 0.93245 -0.06008 0.07959 Acid Test Rat 
AV11 0.08356 -0.07247 0.93238 -0.0336 0.03857  
AV29 0.02801 0.0477 0.83428 0.0295 0.02125  
AV14 0.21361 -0.06458 0.56728 -0.06921 0.05375  
AV9 -0.09912 -0.22971 0.38541 0.12003 -0.11324  
AV8 -0.03511 -0.15406 0.00789 0.95603 -0.0791 Debt Ratio 
AV7 0.0108 -0.17764 0.03582 0.94579 -0.08239  
AV4 -0.54484 0.06223 -0.26769 0.61718 -0.07638  
AV30 -0.63696 0.10467 -0.29463 0.59274 -0.06365  
AV28 0.29103 0.11405 0.02991 -0.05553 0.85276 Oper. Income to Oper. Assets 
AV3 0.2861 0.11693 0.12572 -0.05101 0.83443 ROE 
AV26 -0.15326 -0.04111 -0.0676 0.20873 0.34199  
AV2 -0.14366 0.14659 0.02234 0.12907 0.20599  
AV19 0.22145 0.04943 0.15954 0.06216 0.1735  
AV5 0.03799 0.03864 -0.02968 -0.06232 0.13309  
AV13 0.14881 -0.00484 -0.01065 -0.0236 0.08817  
AV20 0.18857 0.01149 -0.00762 0.10881 0.06763  
AV24 -0.06096 -0.05112 0.25134 0.04928 -0.05732  
AV6 0.04519 -0.16567 -0.15106 0.03923 -0.18804  
AV1 -0.0947 0.06528 0.00447 0.1329 -0.29286  
AV23 0.02336 -0.00917 -0.02472 0.09386 -0.57551  
Table 3: Rotated Component Matrix 
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As with the factor analysis of the macroeconomic variables, the scree test provided the 
number of factors to rotate.  The factor analysis confirmed the cash reservoir framework 
with the four factors in Table 3 named a Profitability Factor, an Activity Factor; a 
Liquidity Factor, and a Leverage Factor plus an additional factor, Return on Equity.  Five 
variables, representative of these factors were used in stage 3 and stage 4 of the analysis.  
These were, earning before tax to assets (ROA), asset turnover (ASSTO), acid-test ratio 
(ACIDRAT) and the debt ratio (DTOASS) and return on equity (ROE). 
Stage 3: Accounting Ratios and Corporate Failure 
Four accounting variables were regressed on a dichotomous dependent variable coded 1 
for fail and 0 for nonfail.  Logit analysis was used to detemine the drivers of failure.  The 
logit function for failure prediction is shown in Table 4 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R Exp B 
DTO 6.7046 2.8937 5.3682 1 .0205 .1625 816.1821 
ACIDRAT 2.1570 1.1947 3.2601 1 .0710 .0994 8.6455 
EBT2ASS -2.8716 .8192 12.2884 1 .0005 -.2840 .0566 
ROE .5303 .9900 .2870 1 .5922 .0000 1.6995 
ASSTOo -2.7914 .9889 7.9682 1 .0047 -2.163 .0613 
Constant -4.8394 3.2094 2.2737 1 .1316   
TABLE 4 Logit Function – Accounting Variables 
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The initial log likelihood function (-2LL) reflects the error associated with the model 
when only the intercept is included in the model.  The inclusion of the accounting ratios 
reduces –2LL from its initial value of 127.53 to 78.981, signifying an improvement in the 
model. The Chi-Square of 48.558 indicates the model is significant, rejecting the null 
hypothesis that none of the independent variables are linearly related to the log odds of 
the dependent. It should be noted that this test does not assure that every independent 
variable is significant.   
The Cox & Snell R2 and the Nagelkerke R2 are similar to the R2 in OLS regression.  The 
Nagelkerke R2 modifies the Cox & Snell R2 so that the measure ranges from 0 to 1.  For 
the accounting variables only the Nagelkerke R2 was 54.7%.   
In conclusion the model is significant with reasonable explanatory power.  The prediction 
rates for the accounting variables are shown in Table 5. 
 
 Predicted  
Obeserved Survive Fail Percent Correct 
Survive 39 7 84.78% 
Fail 11 35 76.09% 
Overall   80.43% 
TABLE 5 – Prediction Results for Accounting variables 
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Stage 4: Accounting Ratios, Macroeconomic Variables and Corporate Failure 
 
A logit model was used to regress the accounting and the economic factors identified in 
the stages one and two against a dichotomous variable representing distressed vs non-
distressed firms.  Various combinations of lag factors were considered for the macro 
economic variables.  To be of any use as explanatory variables, the macroeconomic 
variables must lead the failure of firms.  A priori, one would expect a two year lag in 
interest rates, and a one year lag in the other economic variables.   
This analysis resulted in only two accounting variables being significant and three 
macroeconomic variables being significant.  This combined model had significantly 
better explanatory power then the model using accounting variables only as shown by the 
Nagelkerke R2 of 71.4%.  The –2LL is further reduced by this model to 56.987. 
The Chi-Square for the model is 70.552 which indicate that the model is significant.  
Homer and Lemeshow’s Goodness of Fit Index is an alternative measure of the model’s 
significance.  This model has a Goodness of Fit Index of 465.676 compared with a value 
of 81.943 for the accounting variables model, providing further support for the inclusion 
for macro-economic variables.  
The logit model is shown in Table 6.  All variables except the debt ratio (DTOASS) are 
significant at the .05 level.  The debt ratio is significant at the .10 level.  The constant is 
not significant. 
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Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R Exp B 
DTOASS 4.0458 2.3703 2.9135 1 .0878 .0846 57.1597 
ASSTO -6.3957 1.8956 11.3836 1 .0007 -.2712 .0017 
LAG2BB90 .66672 .2116 9.9422 1 .0016 .2495 1.9488 
LAGGDP 55.9047 20.0081 7.8070 1 .0052 .2134 1.90E24 
LAGCPEBT -16.9547 5.5600 9.2990 1 .0023 -.2392 .0000 
Constant -3.0974 2.7461 1.2721 1 .2594   
TABLE 6: Logit Function – Combined Model 
 
This model has significantly improved explanatory power as shown in Table 7.  The 
results of the analysis were cross validate by holding out each case and testing the 
predictive ability of the model.  There is insufficient data on failed public companies to 
establish a reliable test using a holdout sample.  Test on two companies that are not 
included in the data set, Brashs Ltd. and Burns Phillip confirmed the predictive ability of 
the model one year prior to their failure. 
 Predicted  
Observed Survive Fail Percent Correct 
Survive 42 4 91.30% 
Fail 5 41 90.22% 
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Overall   80.43% 
TABLE 7 – Prediction Results for Combined Model 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to determine if economic variables provide any additional 
explanation of financial distress for a firm compared with accounting variables.  The 
results, though preliminary, are promising.  Three economic variables, interest rates 
lagged two years, gross domestic product lagged one year, and changes in corporate 
profits before tax have a significant influence on firm survival.  The three economic 
variables have some intuitive appeal.  That fact that some economic research suggests a 
two lag between changes in interest rates and their translation into the cost structures of 
businesses makes the two year failure effect appealing.   
When economic variables are included in an explanatory model, only asset turnover, the 
ability to generate sales from assets, has explanatory power.   
Without economic variables in consideration four accounting variables, that are 
surrogates for increasing/decreasing a firm’s cash reservoir, have explanatory power.   
The failure of all the accounting variables to remain in the explanatory model suggests 
that the macroeconomic environment plays a central role in determine corporate survival. 
 To the extent that macro-economic variables are influenced by government policy this 
research shows the connection between that policy and firm survival. 
There are several limitations to the generalizations possible from this research.  First, is 
the common criticism that using a matched pairs design distorts the proportion of failures 
in the sample relative to the total population?  Because of the relatively small number of 
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failed firms for which data exists, the methodological gains from using a matched design 
outweigh the restrictions in generalizability.  The failure to use a holdout sample to test 
the predictive accuracy of the logit model seriously limits the models use as a predictive 
tool.   
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